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Abstract 
 
The secure operation of the routing protocol is one of the major 
challenges to be met for the proliferation of the Mobile Ad hoc 
Networking (MANET) paradigm. Nevertheless, security 
enhancements have been proposed mostly for reactive MANET 
protocols. The proposed here Secure Link State Routing Protocol 
(SLSP) provides secure proactive topology discovery, which can 
be multiply beneficial to the network operation. SLSP can be 
employed as a stand-alone protocol, or fit naturally into a hybrid 
routing framework, when combined with a reactive protocol. 
SLSP is robust against individual attackers, it is capable of 
adjusting its scope between local and network-wide topology 
discovery, and it is capable of operating in networks of 
frequently changing topology and membership.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The collaborative, self-organizing environment of the Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) technology opens the network to 
numerous security attacks that can actively disrupt the routing 
protocol and disable communication. Recently, a number of 
protocols have been proposed to secure the route discovery 
process in frequently changing MANET topologies. These 
protocols are designed to perform route discovery only when a 
source node needs to route packets to a destination; that is, they 
are reactive routing protocols [1-3]. Nevertheless, in many cases, 
proactive discovery of topology can be more efficient; e.g., in 
networks with low- to medium-mobility, or with high connection 
rates and frequent communication with a large portion of the 
network nodes. Furthermore, hybrid routing protocols [4], which 
are the middle ground, have been shown to be capable of 
adapting their operation to achieve the best performance under 
differing operational conditions through locally proactive and 
globally reactive operation.  
In this paper, we study how to provide secure proactive 
routing and we propose a proactive MANET protocol that 
secures the discovery and the distribution of link state 
information across mobile ad hoc domains. Our goal is to 
provide correct (i.e., factual), up-to-date, and authentic link state 
information, robust against Byzantine behavior and failures of 
individual nodes. The choice of a link state protocol provides 
such robustness, unlike distance vector protocols [5], which can 
be significantly more affected by a single misbehaving node. 
Furthermore, the availability of explicit connectivity information, 
present in link state protocols, has additional benefits: examples 
include the ability of the source to determine and route 
simultaneously across multiple routes [6], the utilization of the 
local topology for efficient dissemination of data [7] or efficient 
propagation of control traffic [8]. Finally, a wide range of 
MANET instances is targeted by our design, which avoids 
restrictive assumptions on the underlying network trust and 
membership, and does not require specialized node equipment 
(e.g., GPS or synchronized clocks).  
We present here our Secure Link State Protocol (SLSP) for 
mobile ad hoc networks, which is robust against individual 
attackers. SLSP shares security goals and bears some 
resemblance to secure link state routing protocols proposed for 
the “wired” Internet, but, at the same time, it is tailored to the 
salient features of the MANET paradigm. More specifically, 
SLSP does rely on the requirements of the robust flooding 
protocol [9], that is, a central entity to distribute all keys 
throughout the network and the reliable flooding of link state 
updates throughout the entire network. SLSP does not seek to 
synchronize the topology maps across all nodes or to support the 
full exchange of link state databases [10]. Note that nodes cannot 
be provided with credentials to prove their authorization to 
advertise specific routing information [11] due to the 
continuously changing network connectivity and membership. 
Finally, the participation of nodes in routing does not stem from 
their possession of credentials [12], since in MANET, all nodes 
are expected to equally assist the network operation.  
First we present our assumptions and network model, 
followed by an overview and the definition of SLSP. Next, we 
discuss a number of relevant issues and conclude by describing 
related future work.  
 
2. SLSP Definition 
 
The Secure Link State Protocol (SLSP) for mobile ad hoc 
networks is responsible for securing the discovery and 
distribution of link state information. The scope of SLSP may 
range from a secure neighborhood discovery to a network-wide 
secure link state protocol. SLSP nodes disseminate their link 
state updates and maintain topological information for the subset 
of network nodes within R hops, which is termed as their zone 
[4]. Nevertheless, SLSP is a self-contained link state discovery 
protocol, even though it draws from, and naturally fits within, the 
concept of hybrid routing. 
 
2.1. Assumptions and network model 
 
Each node is equipped with a public/private key pair, namely 
EV and DV, and with a single network interface per node within a 
MANET domain.1 Key certification can be provided by a 
coalition of K nodes and the use of threshold cryptography 
[15,13], the use of local repositories of certificates provided by 
the network nodes [14], or a distributed instantiation of a CA 
[15]. 
Nodes are identified by their IP addresses, which may be 
assigned by a variety of schemes, e.g., dynamically or even 
randomly [16]. Although EV does not need to be tied to the 
node’s IP address, it could be beneficial to use IP addresses 
derived from the nodes’ public keys [17]. Nodes are equipped 
with a one-way or hash function H [18,19] and a public key 
cryptosystem.  
Adversaries may disrupt the protocol operation by exhibiting 
arbitrary malicious behavior: e.g., replay, forge, corrupt link state 
updates, try to influence the topology view of benign nodes, or 
exploit the protocol to mount Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.  
SLSP is concerned solely with securing the topology 
discovery; it does not guarantee that adversaries, which complied 
with its operation during route discovery, would not attempt to 
disrupt the actual data transmission at a later time. The protection 
of the data transmission is a distinct problem, which we address 
in a different publication [6]. 
 
2.2. Overview 
 
To counter adversaries, SLSP protects link state update (LSU) 
packets from malicious alteration, as they propagate across the 
network. It disallows advertisements of non-existent, fabricated 
links, stops nodes from masquerading their peers, strengthens the 
robustness of neighbor discovery, and thwarts deliberate floods 
of control traffic that exhausts network and node resources. 
To operate efficiently in the absence of a central key 
management, SLSP provides for each node to distribute its public 
key to nodes within its zone. Nodes periodically broadcast their 
certified key, so that the receiving nodes validate their 
subsequent link state updates. As the network topology changes, 
nodes learn the keys of nodes that move into their zone, thus 
keeping track of a relatively limited number of keys at every 
instance. 
SLSP defines a secure neighbor discovery that binds each 
node V to its Medium Access Control (MAC) address and its IP 
address, and allows all other nodes within transmission range to 
identify V unambiguously, given that they already have EV. 
Nodes advertise the state of their incident links by 
broadcasting periodically signed link state updates (LSU). SLSP 
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 To support operation with multiple interfaces, one key pair 
should be assigned to each interface. 
restricts the propagation of the LSU packets to within the zone of 
their origin node. Receiving nodes validate the updates, suppress 
duplicates, and relay previously unseen updates that have not 
already propagated R hops. Link state information acquired from 
validated LSU packets is accepted only if both nodes incident on 
each link advertise the same state of the link. 
 
2.3. Neighbor Discovery 
 
Each node commits its Medium Access Control (MAC) 
address and its IP address, the (MACV, IPV) pair, to its neighbors 
by broadcasting signed hello messages. Receiving nodes validate 
the signature and retain the information; in the case of SUCV 
addresses [17] the confirmation for the IP address can be done in 
a memory-less manner. 
The proposed binding of the MACV strengthens the robustness 
of our scheme, by disallowing nodes from appearing as multiple 
ones at the data link layer, and by assisting in protection against 
flooding DoS attacks. 
To achieve these goals, we propose that the Neighbor Lookup 
Protocol (NLP) be an integral part of SLSP. NLP is responsible 
for the following tasks: (i) maintaining a mapping of MAC and 
IP layer addresses of the node's neighbors, (ii) identifying 
potential discrepancies, such as the use of multiple IP addresses 
by a single data-link interface, and (iii) measuring the rates at 
which control packets are received from each neighbor, by 
differentiating the traffic primarily based on MAC addresses. The 
measured rates of incoming control packets are provided to the 
routing protocol. This way, control traffic originating from nodes 
that selfishly or maliciously attempt to overload the network can 
be discarded.  
Basically, NLP extracts and retains the 48-bit hardware source 
address for each received (overheard) frame, along with the 
encapsulated IP address. This requires a simple modification of 
the device driver [18], so that the data link address is “passed up” 
to the routing protocol along with each packet. With nodes 
operating in promiscuous mode, the extraction of such pairs of 
addresses from all overheard packets leads to a significant 
reduction in the use of the neighbor discovery and query/reply 
mechanisms for medium access control address resolution.  
Each node updates its neighbor table by retaining both, the 
data-link and the network interface addresses addresses. The 
mappings between the two addresses are retained in the table as 
long as transmissions from the corresponding neighboring nodes 
are overheard; a lost neighbor timeout period2 is associated with 
each table entry. 
 NLP issues a notification to SLSP, according to the content 
of a received packet, in the event that: (i) a neighbor used an IP 
address different from the address currently recorded in the 
neighbor table, (ii) two neighbors used the same IP address (that 
is, a packet appears to originate from a node that may have 
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 The lost neighbor timeout should be longer than the timeout 
periods associated with the flushing of routing information (link 
state, routing table entries), related to the particular neighbor. 
"spoofed" an IP address), (iii) a node uses the same medium 
access control address as the detecting node (in that case, the data 
link address may be “spoofed”). Upon reception of the 
notification, the routing protocol discards the packet bearing the 
address that violated the aforementioned policies.  
 
2.4. Link State Updates 
 
Link state updates are identified by the IP address of their 
originator and a 32-bit sequence number, which provides an 
ample space of approximately four billion updates. To ensure 
that the LSU’s propagate only within the zone of its origin, i.e., R 
hops away, the node selects a random number X and calculates a 
hash chain: Xi = Hi(X), i=1,...,R, H0(X)=X. It places XR and X1 in 
the zone_radius and the hops_traversed fields of the LSU 
header,3 respectively, and sets TTL equal to R-1, with R placed in 
the RLSU field. Finally, a signature is appended, with the header 
format is shown in Figure 1. 
Receiving nodes check if they have the public key of the 
originating node, unless the key is attached to the LSU (see 
section 2.5 below). For an LSU that has already traveled over i 
hops (i=R-TTL), if i is less than the radius of the originating 
node, the packet is not relayed unless HR-i(hops_traversed) 
equals zone_radius. Each relaying node sets hops_traversed 
equal to H(hops_traversed), decrements TTL, and rebroadcasts 
the LSU. 
 
                       1                   2                   3 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |   TYPE      |      RLSU      |       RESERVED               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         ZONE_RADIUS                           | 
   |                               | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |           SLSP_LSU_SEQ                   | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         LSU_SIGNATURE                         | 
   ...                             ... 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         HOPS_TRAVERSED                        | 
   |             | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
Figure 1: LSU Header 
 
The provided information is discarded after a confirmLS 
timeout, unless both nodes incident on a link report the same 
state. Finally, NLP notifications result in discarding an update 
relayed by a misbehaved node. The flooding of the LSU packets 
renders the protocol resilient against malicious failures (e.g., 
packet dropping, alteration, or modification of the packet’s 
hops_traversed field). Meanwhile, the localized flooding keeps 
the transmission and processing overhead low.  
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 Hash chains have a wide range of applications; in the MANET 
context, they have been used to assist in hop count authentication 
[19].  
2.5. Public Key Distribution 
 
Nodes use Public Key Distribution (PKD) packets, or attach 
their certified keys to LSU packets. PKD packets, shown in 
Figure 2, are flooded throughout the zone, or they may be 
distributed less frequently throughout an extended zone. 
The LSU-based key broadcast provides for timely acquisition 
of the key and thus validation of routing information to nodes 
that move into a new zone. It also reduces to a great extent the 
transmission of PKD packets, thus reducing the message 
complexity. On the other hand, the distribution within an 
extended zone can reduce the delay of validating new keys when 
nodes outside a zone eventually enter the zone. 
Key broadcasts are timed according to the network conditions 
and the device characteristics. For example, a node can 
rebroadcast its key when it detects a substantial change of the 
topology of its zone; that is, if at least some percentage of nodes 
has departed from the node's neighborhood since the last key 
broadcast.  
The certificate “vouches” for the public key. Additionally, the 
authenticity and freshness of the PKD packet are verified by a 
signature from the node that possesses and distributes the key. 
The PKD sequence number is set to the next available value, 
following the increasing values used for LSU packets. When the 
LSU-based key broadcast is used, no additional PKD signature is 
required.  
Nodes validate PKD packets only if they are not already 
aware of the originator's public key. Upon validation, EV and the 
corresponding source IP address are stored locally, along with 
the corresponding sequence number.4 Each node can 
autonomously decide whether to validate a key broadcast or not. 
For example, if it communicates with a nearby destination, it 
might have no incentive to validate a PKD that originates from a 
node a large distance away. Similarly, a validation could be 
avoided if the node considers its topology view broad enough, or 
sufficient to support its communication. This could happen for a 
dense network or zone, when not all physically present links are 
necessary. 
 
2.6. Protection from clogging DoS attacks 
 
In order to guarantee the responsiveness of the routing 
protocol, nodes maintain a priority ranking of their neighbors 
according to the rate of queries observed by NLP. The highest 
priority is assigned to the nodes generating (or relaying) requests 
with the lowest rate and vice versa. Quanta are allocated 
proportionally to the priorities and non-serviced, low-priority 
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 This information is maintained in a FIFO manner. If the entire 
sequence is covered, a new key is generated and distributed, after 
the node voluntarily remains “disconnected” for a period equal to 
NLP’s neighbor_lost. This temporary disconnection ensures that 
the possible change of the node’s IP address does not cause 
neighbors to perceive this as a possible attack (i.e., spoofing of 
an IP address).  
queries are eventually discarded. Within each class, queries are 
serviced in a round-robin manner.  
 
                       1                   2                   3 
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |   TYPE      |      RPKD      |         RESERVED              |  
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         PKD_ZONE_RADIUS                       | 
   |             | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         SLSP_LSU_SEQ                          | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         PKD_SIGNATURE                         | 
   ...                             ... 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                         HOPS_TRAVERSED                        | 
   |             | 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
   |                             EV                                | 
   ...           ... 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
 
Figure 2: PKD packet 
 
Selfish or malicious nodes that broadcast requests at a very 
high rate are throttled back, first by their immediate neighbors 
and then by nodes farther from the source of potential 
misbehavior. On the other hand, non-malicious queries, that is, 
queries originating from benign nodes that regulate in a non-
selfish manner the rate of their query generation, will be affected 
only for a period equal to the time it takes to update the priority 
(weight) assigned to a misbehaving neighbor. In the meantime, 
the round robin servicing of requests provides the assurance that 
benign requests will be relayed even amidst a "storm" of 
malicious or extraneous requests. 
Moreover, malicious floods of spurious PKD packets are 
countered by several mechanisms: (i) NLP imposes a bottleneck 
thanks to the lost neighbor timeout, (ii) PKD packets will not 
propagate more than R hops, unless they are “carried” farther by 
adversaries (e.g., when they don’t update the hops_traversed 
field), (iii) nodes can autonomously decide whether to validate a 
public key or not (e.g., for an very high R), and (iv) PKD packets 
are also subject to restrictions imposed by the above-mentioned 
penalizing priority mechanism.  
 
3. Discussion 
 
SLSP remains vulnerable to colluding attackers; two 
malicious nodes M1, M2 may be able to convince nodes in their 
zones of a non-existent (M1, M2) link. However, it is important 
that any coalition of adversaries can fabricate connectivity only 
among themselves. Furthermore, the use of a protocol such as 
SMT on top of SLSP will promptly reveal such forged links, 
unless the adversaries relay, i.e., tunnel data across such a 
“virtual” link.  
The use of public key cryptography may be a concern as well, 
especially for resource-constrained devices. Clearly, SLSP nodes 
should be able to perform public key operations. Since nodes 
periodically generate (sign) updates and receive (validate) 
updates more frequently, a cryptosystem with the properties of 
RSA would be preferable. Most importantly, SLSP provides for a 
number of ways nodes can minimize their processing while 
retaining the efficiency of the topology discovery. First, nodes 
reduce or increase their LSU broadcast period according to the 
network conditions. With the selection of the appropriate update 
strategy, a reduced rate of broadcasts does not affect the ability 
of nodes to maintain up-to-date connectivity information. 
Moreover, only a small fraction of PKD packets needs to be 
validated by nodes. Furthermore, the mechanisms that mitigate 
clogging denial of service attacks ensure that spurious traffic will 
not consume node resources. 
 
4. Conclusions and future work 
 
We proposed a secure link state protocol (SLSP) for mobile 
ad hoc networks. SLSP is robust against individual Byzantine 
adversaries. Its secure neighbor discovery and the use of NLP 
strengthen SLSP against attacks that attempt to exhaust network 
and node resources. Furthermore, SLSP can operate with 
minimal or no interactions with a key management entity, while 
the credentials of only a subset of network nodes are necessary 
for each node to validate the connectivity information provided 
by its peers.  
The securing of the locally proactive topology discovery 
process by SLSP can be beneficial for MANET for a number of 
reasons. The security mechanisms of SLSP can adapt to a wide 
range of network conditions, and thus retain robustness along 
with efficiency. As the next step of our research, we will present 
a detailed performance evaluation of SLSP, both independently 
and as part of a hybrid framework (i.e., combine it with a secure 
reactive protocol), and for various network instances and node 
processing capabilities.  
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